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Abstract
P. Kotler’s recommendations of modern marketing tell managers how to achieve and 
maintain a dominant market position. Some of the recommended activities may, 
however, infringe European and Polish competition law. Objections are not raised 
by market success achieved as a result of high product quality, good customer care, 
high market shares, continuous product improvements, new product release, entry 
onto fast growing markets, and exceeding customer expectations. Competition law 
problems may appear when a given company, having reached a dominant position, 
starts abusing it by subjugating the market and dictating business conditions to 
other market players (suppliers, customers, consumers). This article focuses on 
predatory pricing, strategic alliances, mergers and acquisitions and State aid issues 
that may arise from the implementation of Kotler’s recommendations. For market 
success not to transform into a competition law problem, it is worth remembering 
the limitations imposed by competition law on the actions of dominant companies. 
The paper outlines these limitations.
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Résumé
Les recommandations de Philip Kotler concernant le marketing moderne conseillent 
aux managers comment atteindre et maintenir une position dominante. Certaines 
des activités recommandées peuvent, pourtant, être en contravention avec la loi 
polonaise et européenne. Les problèmes du droit de la concurrence peuvent 
apparaître quand une entreprise donnée, après avoir atteint une position dominante, 
commence à en abuser par subjuguer le marché et dicter ses conditions aux autres 
participants du marché (fournisseurs, clients, consommateurs). Cet article se 
concentre sur les prix prédateurs, alliances stratégiques, fusions-acquisitions et sur 
les questions de l’aide publique resultant de l’implantation des recommandations 
de Kotler. Pour que le succès du marché ne se transforme pas en échec, il faut 
prendre en considération les limitation imposées par le droit de la concurrence sur 
les actions des entreprises dominantes. Cet article décrit ces limitations. 
Classifications and key words: competition; dominant market position; predatory 
pricing; strategic alliances; preventive control of mergers and acquisitions; exploitive 
or anti-competitive practices; State aid; leniency procedure; Kotler’s theory of 
modern marketing.
I. Competition and domin a nce in Kotler’s theory
Philip Kotler, a renowned authority of marketing theories, famous lecturer 
and advisor to global companies, assumed that market dominance is indicative 
of effective marketing that can guarantee success in business relations1. Other 
commentators recommend striving to attain market dominance also within 
the framework of effective strategic management and marketing concepts2. 
Another eminent theoretician of management sciences, P. F. Druker, 
uses the expression ‘to go the whole hog’ in order to reflect the essence of a 
business strategy aimed at dominating the market. He explains it using the 
example of two companies: Hoffman-LaRoche and Du Pont which, having 
conquered their own competitors, dominated the market of vitamins and 
plastics respectively. Practice showed, however, that by implementing a strategy 
of market dominance, they violated the rules of European competition law and 
American antitrust law and thus became subject to infringement proceedings 
in Europe as well as in the U.S.3.
1 P. Kotler, Kotler o marketingu. Jak tworzyć, zdobywać i dominować na rynkach, Katowice 2006.
2 K. Obłój, Tworzywo skutecznych strategii, Warszawa 2002, p. 81, 117; P. F. Drucker, Myśli 
przewodnie Druckera, Warszawa 2002, p. 263.
3 Decision EC 76/642/EEC; IV/29.020 Vitamins. H.Hovencamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, 
West Publishing Co., 1994, p. 341 and the following.
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The definition of marketing stating that ‘Marketing is the art and science 
of winning and keeping customers and taking care of relations with them’4 
is of key importance for P. Kotler’s concept. The last part thereof has found 
particular confirmation in practical terms. A survey conducted within the 
framework of the Technical Assistant Research Program (1986) referred to 
by P. Kotler illustrated that the cost of winning a new client is five times 
higher than that of keeping an existing one5. Experience shows that this is, for 
instance, why telecoms operators offer promotions to new clients only despite 
the fact that such offers may be perceived as a form of discrimination of clients 
already loyal to the company. 
P. Kotler’s recommendations on effective marketing aimed at the acquisition 
of market power may also lead to a situation known in the economic practice 
(Microsoft, Intel, Tetra Pak) as business success combined with a competition 
law problem. Although the mere fact of enjoying a dominant position does 
not violate competition law in itself, the abuse thereof is considered an 
infringement. The methods of arriving at a dominant position by internal 
(profit accumulation) or external growth (concentration of companies) may 
also be subject to the provisions of competition law. Indeed, its application 
constantly raises questions about the efficiency criteria when assessing a given 
company’s marketing behavior. Born in mind must be the fact, however, that 
consumer interests, understood as the fulfillment of their right to choose the 
place, price and quality of the goods purchased, is the ultimate criterion for 
the evaluation of the consequences of the behavior in question. 
P. Kotler is right in saying that to be successful in business one needs to use 
modern marketing techniques and its fundamental elements, such as: networking 
with other market players (especially when it comes to the reduction of distribution 
costs by creating common distribution networks); focusing marketing activities on 
the market with a view to find new customers and win their loyalty; and selecting 
suppliers based on the criteria of price, quality and delivery terms6. However, 
paths leading to market dominance, if continued after it has already been attained, 
may be considered to constitute a prohibited monopolistic practice exercised by a 
dominant company. Warnings of that type are absent from P. Kotler’s theory even 
though they may complicate the operations of a dominant company when it finds 
itself facing a conflict with competition law. 
Although it would be a too far-reaching simplification to assume that 
P. Kotler’s theory of modern marketing recommends the monopolization of 
the economy, it is worth highlighting the potential negative external effects of its 
4 P. Kotler, Kotler o marketingu…, p. 199.
5 Ibidem, p. 200.
6 P. Kotler, Kotler o marketingu…, p. 24.
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implementation7. Despite the fact that P. Kotler’s very sizable textbook contains 
some brief notes on American antitrust rules, these comments are not reflected 
in his marketing recommendations8. The author expects thus his readers to 
singlehandedly answer the question: how to run a business without infringing 
antitrust provisions? P. Kotler pays somewhat more attention to pricing policy 
making it possible for his readers to skillfully surf between the antitrust reefs9. 
This paper illustrates what competition law threats arise from the 
application of P. Kotler’s concept of modern marketing. Examples are given 
of competition law enforcement practice in both Poland and European 
Union to anti-competitive and exploitive practices10 resulting from the 
abuse of a dominant position (taking advantage of existing market power) 
and to restrictive agreements. The paper covers also preventive control of 
concentrations and competition-distorting State aid.
A number of specific considerations are important to the concept of modern 
marketing formulated by P. Kotler including: pricing policy as a tool of an 
effective competitive struggle11; winning and keeping client loyalty12; strategic 
alliances as an effective future of marketing13; and mergers by acquiring 
other companies or brands14. When advising company managers to engage in 
the above activities, it is worth drawing their attention to issues where they 
potentially collide with competition law15.
II. Pricing policy as a tool of effective competitive struggle 
Pricing independence is the inherent right of companies in the market 
economy. Nevertheless, having attained market power, a dominant company 
makes pricing decisions indicative of the existence of exploitive or anti-
competitive practices. Competition law is designed to prevent such situations. 
When it comes to pricing practices, competition law enforcement focuses on 
 7 S. Bishop, J.M. Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law: Concepts, Application 
and Measurement, 2nd edition, Sweet&Maxwell, London 2002.
 8 P. Kotler, Marketing. Analiza, planowanie, wdrażanie i kontrola, Warszawa 1994, p. 71, 
pp. 150–151.
 9 Ibidem, p. 465.
10 T. Skoczny, ‘Ochrona konkurencji a prokonkurencyjna regulacja sektorowa’ [‘Competition 
Protection and Procompetitive Sectoral Regulation’] (2004) 3 Problemy Zarządzania 7–34.
11 P. Kotler, Kotler o marketingu…, p. 26.
12 Ibidem, p. 37.
13 Ibidem, p. 38.
14 Ibidem, p. 82.
15 More on the subject in: A. Fornalczyk, Biznes a ochrona konkurencji, Kraków 2007.
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the analysis of data and information which makes it possible to distinguish 
normal business activities from monopolistic practices. 
P. Kotler recommends conquering competitors by way of lower prices in 
order to arrive at a high market share. The strategy of offering prices lower 
than those of the competition is justified in business terms and does not 
infringe competition law provided it results from cost advantages enjoyed by 
the dominant company. Predatory pricing strategies, which aim to eliminate 
competition, are not allowed however16. 
S. Bishop and M. Walker define predatory pricing as ‘…the deliberate 
sacrifice of profits in the short run in the expectation of earning more profits 
in the long run after the rival has exited the market.’17 Accordingly, when 
assessing a predatory pricing policy of a dominant company it is essential to 
identify the ultimate objective of that strategy. Once competitors are driven 
out of the market, dominant companies tend to increase their prices to a level 
that excessively compensates (‘monopoly rent’) their losses born as a result of 
the earlier offering of glaringly low prices. 
The Areeda – Turner test (TAT) can be used in order to assess whether 
a policy of low prices used in the competitive struggle bears the signs of 
predatory pricing. The test considers a price below short-term marginal costs 
to be predatory (glaringly low)18. However, since short-term marginal costs are 
difficult to calculate in practice, its authors allow for the possibility to apply 
average variable costs instead. The TAT method has been open to criticism 
as it is difficult to apply in competition law proceedings19. Although the test 
is applied in both explanatory and full antitrust proceedings, it is used as an 
auxiliary tool only. It is assumed in competition law enforcement practices 
that a price below average variable costs should be considered to be predatory 
and, as such, illegal. However, the intention to apply predatory prices must be 
proven, that is, the dominant company’s aim to drive its competitors out of 
the market must be clear. In Europe, the Tetra Pak case20 is an unprecedented 
example of counteracting predatory pricing. The President of the Polish 
Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (in Polish: Urząd Ochrony 
16 In the Polish Act on Competition and Consumer Protection [Art. 9(2)(1)] predatory 
prices are referred to as glaringly low prices.
17 S. Bishop, M. Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law…, p. 219. 
18 P.E. Areeda, D.F.Turner, ‘Predatory Pricing and Related Practices under Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act’ (1975) 88 Harvard Law Review 697-733.
19 S. Bishop, M. Walker, The Economics of EC Competition Law…, pp. 231–238.
20 EC decision Tetra Pak II (IV/31043 – Tetra Pak II). ECJ ruling: C-333/94 P Tetra Pak 
v European Commission, ECR [1996] I-595l. Other decisions by the European Commission on 
predatory prices see: ECS/AKZO, OJ [1985] L 374/1; Eurofix-Bauco/Hilti, OJ [1988] L 65/19; 
Napier Bron/British Sugar, OJ [1988] L 284/41.
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Konkurencji i Konsumenta; hereafter, UOKiK) takes actions to counteract 
predatory pricing also21.
While recommending the application of a low prices strategy, P. Kotler 
discusses also the possibility of a company being subsidized by the government 
and, as a result, offering prices lower than its competitors22. In the European 
Union, State aid is subject to the provisions of Article 107–109 of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), to Regulations issued 
by the European Parliament and Commission, and to a number of soft-law 
documents that help prevent lasting infringements of market competition by 
the beneficiaries of State aid. 
State aid may take a variety of forms in practice (subsidies, tax\allowances, 
preferential loans, capital injections) all of which are monitored by the 
European Commission. Aid granted by the governments of individual Member 
States must be notified to the Commission according to a set of notification 
requirements specific in appropriate legislation. Aid granted in breach of EU 
rules is illegal and should be recovered. A low prices policy pursued as a result 
of State aid infringes EU competition law and is incompatible with the internal 
market. 
In parallel to the activities of the European Union, the World Trade 
Organization also counteracts the attainment of a competitive advantage by 
entities subsidized by the governments of one of its members on the basis of 
its own antidumping provisions. The difference between the EU and WTO 
set of State aid rules lies in the fact that the former provisions are applied ex 
ante while the later procedures are implemented on an ex post basis. When 
developing a low prices strategy with a view to conquer competition and 
dominate a market, it is thus worth keeping in mind such strategy’s potential 
conflicts with competition law and State aid provisions.
A low prices policy may also consist of granting rebates to customers which, 
according to P. Kotler, may be helpful in winning and keeping client loyalty23. 
P. Kotler rightly stresses the consequences of rebates for the profit levels of 
the company granting them. Excessive rebates may indeed increase sales and 
help win loyal customers, but they may reduce the profitability of the dominant 
company also. Nonetheless, attention should be paid to restrictions placed by 
21 Decisions of the UOKiK President: WR-9/2001; RKT-24/2001; RLU-13/2001; RGD-
2/2002; RKR-22/2002; RŁO-41/2005; RKT-03/2006. Orders by the Anti-Monopoly Court: 
XVII Amr 59/93; XVII Amr 28/95; XVII Amr 24/96. Orders of the Court of Competition and 
Consumer Protection: XVII Amr 11/95; XVII Ama 51/97; XVII Ama 49/00; XVII Ama 28/01; 
XVII Ama 49/02; XVII Ama 70/03; XVII Ama 83/03.
22 P. Kotler, Kotler o konkurencji…, p. 230.
23 Ibidem, p. 37, p. 167.
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competition law on the formulation and implementation of a rebates policy 
by dominant companies.
Loyalty rebates are recommended by P. Kotler as a method of maintaining 
a given company’s dominant market position. However, such practices are 
considered restrictive vis-a-vis competition by both the European as well 
as Polish competition law jurisprudence as they eliminate competitors with 
a weaker market position than the dominant company and close the market 
to potential competitors24. The essence of rebates may lie in the imposition 
of a given scale of purchase that excludes suppliers other than the dominant 
company. It may also lie in retroactive rebates or making the size of the 
rebate dependent upon the length of the commercial agreement between 
the dominant company and its customers. Rebates policy, if justified from 
a business standpoint, should be conducted in accordance with binding 
competition law provisions if the company wishes to be successful in business 
without having to face competition law problems.
III. Strategic alliances and anti-competitive agreements
P. Kotler considers strategic alliances the ‘effective future of marketing’25. 
This statement is true albeit it is worth adding that strategic alliances may 
also include R&D, production cooperation, staff training, investment and the 
building of common marketing channels. The theory of management, especially 
strategic management, describes and studies the premises and positive effects 
of agreements between undertakings26. ‘Strategic alliance is a cooperation 
between present or potential competitors which impacts the position of other 
competitors, suppliers or customers within the same or related sectors’27. 
Most generally, the reasons for strategic alliances can be defined as: ‘(...) 
the reduction of risk and re-grouping of resources by creating new structural 
24 EC decisions: 76/642/EEC; IV/29.020 Vitamins, BPB Industries plc IV/31.900, 
COMP/3.133-B; COMP/3.133-C; COMP/3.133-D. Ruling of the Court of First Instance in the 
case 65/89 BPB Industries plc and British Gypsum Ltd v European Commission, ECR [1993] 
II-389; decision of the UOKiK President: DDI-110/2002.
25 P. Kotler, Kotler o marketingu…, p. 38.
26 M. Romanowska, Alianse strategiczne przedsiębiorstw, Warszawa 1997; G. Stonehouse, 
J. Hamill, D. Campbell, T. Purdi, Globalizacja. Strategia i zarządzanie, Warszawa 2001, pp. 
128-132, 275-281; G. Gierszewska, B. Wawrzyniak, Globalizacja. Wyzwania dla zarządzania 
strategicznego, Warszawa 2001, pp. 129–138; M. Romanowska, Planowanie strategiczne 
w przedsiębiorstwie, Warszawa 2004, pp. 236–261.
27 M. Romanowska, Planowanie…, p. 15.
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configurations, “hybrid organizations” which enable the implementation of 
assumed goals with simultaneous protection of partners’ interests’28. 
While taking advantage of the benefits of strategic alliances, it is worth 
remembering that horizontal agreements between competitors are not allowed 
to lead to the restriction of market competition. Restrictive agreements 
strengthen the market position of their parties and may result in practices 
identical to the abuse of dominance29. Both European and Polish competition 
law counteract such agreements. 
Cartels are especially dangerous to competition as agreements between 
competitors that fix prices, output and sales quotas or share the markets. To 
establish that an infringement of competition law took place by a cartel, it is 
irrelevant whether the pricing policy, as well as any other coordinated activity, 
was agreed upon directly by the companies participating in the agreement or 
via their sectorial associations. From the point of view of competition law, it is 
not the form of the agreement that is important (e.g. gentelmen agreement, in 
writing) but its objective and market outcome. Indeed, competition law applies 
to companies participating in non-operational collusions30 also and even to 
situations when the participants did not stick to the cartel decision but merely 
remained party to it31. 
H. Hovenkamp states on the basis of economic practice studies that 
cartels are more damaging to the economy than a company’s dominant 
position because they are formed more quickly and do not require outlays 
as high as those needed to attain dominance32. Taking account of P. Kotler’s 
recommendation to use strategic alliances in marketing, it should be noted that 
the latter constitute the most sensitive type of activity in terms of competition 
law. Hence, both the European Commission and the UOKiK President enforce 
competition law to fight cartels33.
28 Y. Allaire, M.E. Firsirotu, Myślenie strategiczne, Warszawa 2000, p. 361. 
29 Bellamy & Child, Common Market Law of Competition. Fourth edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 1993, chapter 9; S. Gronowski, Ustawa antymonopolowa. Komentarz, Warszawa 1999, 
p. 99 and the following R. Whish, Competition Law, Third edition, Butterworths, London, 
Edinburgh, 1993, pp. 270–278.
30 Exemplified by the case Ferry Operators, OJ [1997] L 26/23.
31 Exemplified by the case BELASCO, OJ [1986] L 232/15.
32 H. Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy, pp. 140–184.
33 EC decisions: COMP/E-1/37.512 – Vitamins, COMP IV/33.126 and 33.322, 
COMP/C.38.279/F3-French beef, COMP/E-1/37.152 – Plasterboard, COMP/E-1/37.370-Sorbates, 
COMP 94/599/EC (PCV II) [OJ] 1994 L 239/14, COMP 89/191/EEC (PCV I) [OJ] 1989 L 74/21, 
COMP 86/398/EEC (Polypropylene) [OJ] 1986 L 230/1) and 69/243/EEC (Dyestuffs) [OJ] 1969 
L 195/11). Decisions of the UOKiK President: RPZ-21/2002; RPZ-36/2005; DO-II-500-8-
93/1285/SS; DAR-15/2006; DOK-99/2007; DOK-7/2009. Order of the Court of Competition 
and Consumer Protection XVII Amr 8/94.
VOL. 2011, 4(5)
COMPETITION PROTECTION AND PHILIP KOTLER’S STRATEGIC… 19
As cartels are particularly detrimental to market competition, the European 
Commission imposes especially high fines on their participants. Between 
1990–2011, the total amount of cartel fines imposed in the EU exceeded EUR 
17 bn. In the case of the car-glass cartel, the fine imposed on its participants 
in 2008 amounted to EUR 1.400 m; in the case of the elevators and escalators 
cartel, the fine totaled EUR 1.100 m34. Having said that, pecuniary penalties 
imposed by the authorities are not the only problem for the participants of a 
cartel. They might also need to face the consequences of private enforcement 
of competition law whereby company which suffered losses as a result of the 
operation of a cartel may file for damages and be compensated for profits lots.
Cartel participants that wish to avoid painful fines may take advantage 
of the leniency procedure. It consists of a reduction or non-imposition of 
a pecuniary penalty on the company that was first to inform the competent 
authority about the existence of a cartel and submits data on its duration, 
operation and market consequences. The leniency procedure helps competition 
law enforcement bodies to uncover cartels. The scale of cartel fines may thus 
be dependent upon the tendency among cartel participants to cooperate with 
the competent authorities in the course of the proceedings.
In order to reduce transaction costs, strategic alliances in marketing may 
also take the form of vertical agreements between producers and distributors35. 
Transaction costs are of key importance when deciding on how to build 
marketing channels: as an organizational part of a given company or long-term 
distribution agreements with independent distributors36. Long-term selective 
or exclusive agreements are very often applied together with distribution 
franchising agreements. They are anti-competitive if they excessively restrict 
the independence of the participating distributors, especially by interfering with 
their pricing and purchase policies. Both European and Polish competition law 
prevents such agreements – an important realization for managers responsible 
for the development of distribution networks37 In numerical terms, the 
decisional practice of the UOKiK President on anti-competitive agreements 
34 http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/statistics/statistics.pdf (23 September 2011).
35 O.E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies. Analysis and Antitrust Implications, New York, 
London 1983.
36 A. Fornalczyk, ‘Strategia dominacji rynkowej a ochrona konkurencji na wspólnym 
rynku Unii Europejskiej (na przykładzie organizowania dystrybucji)’ [in:] J. W. Wiktor (ed.), 
Euromarketing. Koncepcje, strategie, metody, Kraków 1999, pp. 60–81.
37 EC decisions: COMP/IV/31.428–31.432 – Yves Rocher; COMP. IV/35.733 – VW; 
COMP/F-2/36.693, COMP/36.264-Mercedes-Benz, COMP/E2/36623 36820 – SEP and others/
Automobiles Peugeot SA, COMP IV-A/00004-03344 Grundig-Consten. COMP.F.1/35.918, COMP/
IV/26825 – Prym-Beka; COMP/IV/30570 – Whisky and Gin; COMP/E-2/36.041/PO – Michelin. 
CFI judgement T-203/01 Michelin, ECR [2003] II-4071; ECJ judgement 56 and 58/64 Consten-
Grundig [1966] ECR 299. Decision of the UOKiK President: WR-32/98.
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is clearly dominated by decisions concerning re-sell price fixing in distribution 
networks38.
IV. Preventive control of concentrations
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) offer an alternative to strategic alliances 
in order to strengthen market position. Mergers result in higher concentration 
of assets in the hands of a single company, the outcome of acquisitions is the 
creation and expansion of capital groups. Competition law treats a capital 
group as one economic entity because subsidiaries are coordinated by the 
dominant company within the group. A joint venture is also a form of 
concentration whereby control is exercised together by the participants to 
the concentration. 
There can be strategic, financial and managerial reasons for concentrations. 
Practice shows that strengthening of the market position of a given 
operation’s participants constitutes an important reason for concentrations, 
especially when it involves competitors39. This is why P. Kotler recommends 
concentrations and the acquisition of brands among other methods of arriving 
at and maintaining market dominance. Summing up the strategy, it is worth 
knowing that concentrations are subject to preventive control by competent 
authorities, the conditions of which are specified by competition law.When 
assessing the market consequences of a planned concentration the following 
are taken into account: existence of distribution agreements between the 
participants; market scope of the distribution networks belonging to the 
parties to the planned concentration; as well as their joint undertakings40. 
The effects and organization of the marketing activities of the participants 
of a concentration may thus be important for a competition law assessment 
of its market consequences. An extensive distribution network belonging to 
the parties covering a substantial part of the market in question may make 
it difficult for the transaction to be cleared. A prohibition of a concentration 
may also occur when the planned operation leads to the creation of a duopoly 
or an oligopolistic market structure41. 
38 Decisions of the UOKiK President: DOK-12/2010; RKT-48/2010; RGD-31/2010; DOK-
6/2010; RKT-47/2009; RKT-44/2009; RKT-43/2009; RKT-114/2008; RKT-79/2007.
39 A. Fornalczyk, Strategie…, pp. 152-153.
40  Pilkington-Techint/SIV, 21 December 1993, IV/M.358.
41 Case IV/M. 190 - Nestlé/Perrier; 97/816/EC Boeing Company (Boeing)/ McDonnell Douglas 
Corporation (MDC); COMP/M.3943. T-102/96 Gencor Ltd v Commission, ECR [1999] II-753; 
T-342/99 Airtours plc v Commission, ECR [2002] II-2585; T-5/02 Tetra Laval v Commission, ECR 
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Concentrations restrict market competition in most cases, decisive for 
a  competition law assessment is the scale of that restriction. Competition 
law stipulates that if a market is dominated by a company created as a result 
of a merger, or by a capital group created by acquisition, the appropriate 
competition law body is likely to issue a negative or conditional decision in that 
case. Divestiture is a usual approval condition for a new company or capital 
group. When advising a company or a capital group to gain market power by 
way of a concentration, it is worth stressing the need to perform a pre-merger 
assessment of the operation in light of competition law criteria. A pre-emptive 
evaluation conducted within the company will save it crucial time and money 
during the official investigation and will allow it to better prepare the notification 
documents that must be submit to the relevant authority. 
Companies often perceive the duty to notify concentrations which meet 
the criteria of specific competition law regimes as an obstacle to such 
transactions. Statistics show, however, that the European Commission does 
not block transaction justified by economic reasons. Between 1990–2011, the 
Commission received a total of 476 notifications. Only 36 of them underwent a 
more detailed assessment (they went through to the 2nd stage of the procedure) 
as a result of which, 21 negative and 4 conditional decisions were ultimately 
issued42.
V. Antitrust recommendations for modern marketing
Market success achieved thanks to high product quality, good customer care, 
high market share, continuous product improvements and new product entry, 
entering fast growing markets, or going beyond customer expectations43 does 
not raise competition law objections. Such problems may appear, however, 
when a company arrives at a dominant position and starts abusing it so as to 
subordinate the market to itself and to dictate business conditions to other 
market players (suppliers, customers, consumers). In order for market success 
not to transform into a competition law problem, it is worth being aware 
of the restrictions inscribed thereby upon marketing activities of a dominant 
company. A strategy of low prices cannot take the form of predatory pricing but 
competition law will not be infringed if low prices result from cost reductions 
[2002] II-4381; T-310/01 Schneider Electric v Commission, ECR [2002] II-4071. Decision of the 
UOKiK President: DOK-41/06.
42 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/statistics.pdf (23 September 2011).
43 Such recommendations are formulated by P. Kotler in his book Kotler o marketingu…, 
pp. 23–29. 
YEARBOOK OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY STUDIES
22  ANNA FORNALCZYK
due to technical or technological innovations or efficient goods distribution 
which reduces the dominant company’s transaction costs. 
Strategic alliances, as long-term agreements on business cooperation, may 
contribute to the achievement of any of the aforementioned elements of market 
success. They should not, however, take the form of cartels that monopolize the 
market (horizontal agreements) and should not restrict competition by limiting 
the pricing and purchasing independence of distributors (vertical agreements). 
Economic importance of cooperation and competition was correctly defined 
by A.M. Brandenburger and B.J. Nalebuff as co-opetition, that is, cooperation 
in value creation and competition in its division44. Value is created in the 
production process (R&D, techniques and technology) and divided on the 
market where competition is protected by the law. The strategy of achieving 
and maintaining market dominance should not infringe competition law if 
a company wishes to avoid becoming subject to enforcement proceedings 
leading to the prohibition of its anti-competitive or exploitive practices as 
well as a pecuniary penalty. 
Concentrations meeting the criteria specified in competition law are subject 
to a notification duty to the relevant competition body. Well drafted notification 
documents, preceded by an initial assessment of the probability of a positive 
decision, shorten the wait for an official decision to be taken by the relevant 
authority. This, in turn, translates into cost savings in the transaction budget. 
Managers who conquer markets following P. Kotler’s recommendations should 
be aware of these facts.
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